In the current multilateral trade regime, members often negotiate under the shadow of WTO law. This article develops a formal explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation can influence multilateral trade negotiations. We contend that the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant's bargaining power, opening a bargaining window and ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. On the other hand, the complainant's preference for loss-mitigation over gains from retaliation and its expectations about the likelihood that the defendant will not comply with an adverse ruling can augment the defendant's bargaining leverage. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increased enforcement does not necessarily make actors shy away from further cooperation, although the credibility of the defendant's non-compliant threats crucially affects the location of any potential negotiated agreement. Empirically, we show that the argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural negotiations in the Doha round.
Introduction 1
With the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a lively scholarly debate has emerged about the effect of more judicialized adjudication of trade complaints, in comparison with the GATT's political-diplomatic system of dispute settlement. The strengthened enforcement mechanism of WTO rules means that member states can expect to face high costs if they breach those rules (Zangl, 2008) . The dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO delegated adjudication to an independent third party (panels and Appellate Body) and strengthened enforcement by introducing a credible threat of multilaterally authorized sanctions in case of non-compliance. This evolution has been referred to as the legalization or judicialization of the present international trade regime.
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Scholars have inquired into how judicialization affects the trade-related interests of and the trade-policy-making dynamics among domestic actors in WTO member states (key economic interest groups and policymakers alike) in two ways. One strand of literature analyzes the effects of judicialization on the prospects for further cooperation in the WTO. Some authors suggest that a high degree of bindingness of trade rules may decrease the propensity of WTO members to commit to new agreements (Goldstein and Martin 2000) , while others have argued in the opposite direction (De Bièvre, 2006; Poletti, 2011; Rosendorff, 2005) A second strand of literature focuses on the politics of WTO dispute settlement, investigating why states decide to initiate disputes (Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, 2009) , why disputes escalate Davis, 2013; Guzmann and Simmons, 2002) and under what conditions parties comply with WTO dispute settlement panels decisions (Bown, 2004; Goldstein and Steinberg, 2008) .
To date, surprisingly little effort has been devoted to integrating these two largely separate strands of literature. Journalists' accounts, policy-oriented research, and even scholarly studies on the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations have hinted at the 'shadow of WTO law' as a key determinant of policy preferences, bargaining strategies, and tactics of parties prior to and during the Doha round. For instance, several studies concur that the expiration of the 'peace clause' of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and the subsequent disputes against EU and US agricultural subsidies strongly influenced the Doha round negotiations concerning agriculture (Poletti, 2010; Porterfield, 2006; Sumner, 2005) . Similarly, WTO disputes against EU precautionary-principle-based regulations influenced negotiations on so-called trade-and-environment issues (Kelemen, 2010; Sicurelli 2012, Skogstad, 2003) . Despite this evidence, to our knowledge, no systematic, theoretically-informed study has yet been produced to investigate whether, under what conditions, and how the decision by one WTO member to initiate a legal dispute against another affects cooperative dynamics in the context of WTO negotiations. Although Busch and Reinhardt (2000) have shown how uncertainty about each sides' preference in a WTO dispute might encourage settlement before the dispute escalates, the question of how the threat (or use) of litigation affects bargaining dynamics in multilateral trade negotiations remains unaddressed.
This analysis offers a systematic investigation of the causal mechanisms that link legal vulnerability in the WTO (i.e., the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation) and multilateral trade negotiations. In this article, we seek to explain why and under what conditions the initiation of a WTO dispute while multilateral trade negotiations are ongoing may make successful negotiations more likely. More specifically, we contend that legal vulnerability can increase the set of feasible agreements for both sides, relative to the status quo ante, thus potentially increasing the likelihood of cooperation in multilateral negotiations. It is obvious why a member state challenged in WTO litigation would have an interest in drowning the controversy in ongoing, broad-based, multilateral negotiations. For a defendant, shifting the issue to the bargaining table of multilateral trade negotiations provides opportunities to minimize or offset the likely adjustment costs of an adverse WTO panel ruling (Poletti 2010) . It is much less obvious why the complainant in such a dispute would acquiesce to the defendant's strategy, seeking a solution to the controversy through multilateral negotiations, if it can expect to win (or has won) such a case in WTO litigation.
We contend that while the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant's bargaining power, the complainant's preference for lossmitigation over gains from retaliation augments the defendant's leverage. The balance between these two forces opens a bargaining window, ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. The complainant's increased bargaining power, however, is conditional, to some extent, upon a belief that litigation will produce a compliant response on the part of the defendant. If the defendant is not expected to comply, then, although a bargaining window will still exist, the complainant will be able to extract fewer concessions from the defendant. Therefore, our argument encompasses two potential sources of variation: the existence of a judicialization regime, and the likelihood that the defendant will comply with an adverse ruling. The first affects whether a bargaining range exists, while the second helps to explain where on that range a potential agreement is likely to be located.
In line with standard international political economy approaches, the assumption underpinning our analysis is that governments' choices over trade policies can be conceived of as a function of the preferences and political pressures emanating from key economic interest groups defined by society as a result of a rational calculation about the expected distributional consequences of cooperative agreements. We thus conceive of political actors not as advocates of a specific trade policy independent of constituency demands, but rather as office-maintainers and -seekers, avoiding the mobilization of political enemies (Frieden, 1991; Milner, 1988; Rogowski, 1989) .
With this piece, we contribute to the debate on the institutional underpinnings of cooperation in the international trade regime in different ways. Contrary to earlier expectations (Goldstein and Martin 2000) , we show how increased bindingness of international trade rules may ignite a positive dynamic of cooperation. In addition, we complement the findings of the literature on the politics of dispute settlement, showing that retaliation backed by law not only can increase the likelihood of negotiated settlement during the consultation phase of WTO litigation (Busch and Reinhardt, 2000; Reinhardt, 2001 ), but can also increase the chances of cooperation in multilateral trade rounds.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature that deals with the question of how the WTO affects the domestic politics of trade policymaking. Second, we develop an argument that shows why judicialization can increase domestic actors' propensity to conduct issue linkage negotiations in the WTO. Third, we subject our argument to empirical scrutiny by carrying out an in-depth qualitative analysis of how potential defendants (the European Union (EU) and the United States (US)) and a potential complainant (Brazil) in WTO disputes, approached agricultural trade negotiations in the Doha Round. In the final section, we draw our conclusions.
Legal vulnerability and the domestic politics of trade policy making
The existing literature on how WTO judicialization affects cooperation concentrates on the fundamental question of how such an institutional innovation affects a member state's preferences when deciding whether to expand the range of rules to which they should be committed. It has been convincingly argued that stronger enforcement of rules can make further cooperation less likely in the WTO (Goldstein and Martin 2000) . While increased enforceability makes agreements more credible, it also makes them more tightly binding.
Because governments value institutional flexibility as a tool to deal with the uncertainty of future economic interactions, it is plausible to expect them to believe that the costs of signing such agreements outweigh the benefits. This argument is consistent with and largely overlaps the scholarly research focusing on the relationship between uncertainty and the design of international institutions (Downs and Rocke 1995, Koremenos et al. 2001 ).
These analyses however, focus only on how prospective enforceability of future agreements can affect an actor's propensity to commit to such agreements. In the context of the WTO, this perspective essentially questions whether member states will be prone to widen organizational jurisdiction to a host of new issue areas.
However, WTO member states not only face a choice between committing or not committing to new binding agreements. They are already bound by a wide array of agreements within the organization. This means that member states may happen to negotiate under the shadow of WTO law: they may engage in multilateral negotiations while foreign partners could (and sometimes do) challenge them through WTO litigation. Thus, whenever such negotiations touch upon issues already governed by organizational law, member states may face a choice between litigation and negotiation if trading partners initiate legal disputes against them while negotiations are ongoing. But how exactly does litigation affect multilateral trade negotiations? Does it increase the bargaining space in negotiations or does it create new obstacles on the path towards agreement? And when does it empower a complainant?
In the next sections we make two arguments. First, during multilateral trade negotiations, when a member state has the option to challenge another (successfully) through WTO dispute-resolution mechanisms, the set of feasible agreements for both sides may increase and overlap, strengthening the chance of agreement relative to the status quo ante. Second, the efficacy of this mechanism is dependent in part upon the willingness of the defendant to comply with a ruling in the complainant's favor.
Below, we present a simple game in which two states bargain over the reduction of tradedistorting measures in the shadow of judicialization. Negotiations on the liberalization of international trade in the trade regime take the shape of exchanges of reciprocal market access concessions between trading partners. Exporters in one WTO member state mobilize, demanding that their government seek the removal of trade-distorting measures, which provide import-competing producers in the other state with protection from foreign competition. Whether an agreement will be struck depends on whether the sets of feasible agreements for the parties involved in the negotiations overlap at a particular point in time.
Since the introduction of a quasi-judicial mechanism of dispute resolution in the trade regime, however, governments possess an additional tool to target trade-distorting measures that are incompatible with WTO rules. Indeed, member states that enjoy the benefits of protectionism through legally vulnerable policy tools can no longer consider the status quo as a cost-free strategy, as those seeking the removal of WTO-incompatible policies can impose adjustment costs on them through the imposition of retaliatory measures, following authorization from a WTO dispute settlement or Appellate Body ruling. As the analysis of the following model shows, when a WTO member successfully takes legal action (or can credibly threaten to take legal action) against another member state, it can significantly affect negotiations by increasing the set of feasible agreements both sides are ready to accept. However, this mechanism is mediated by the complainant's belief that the defendant will eventually comply with the ruling. It is important to note that our argument holds only when the two sides involved in a dispute are in an interdependent trading relationship. This is a scope condition for our proposed mechanism. Only when this condition is satisfied will each side value the other's market as a destination and therefore be in a position to pursue or threaten to pursue policies that can generate losses for the other side.
Model Setup
Suppose that during multilateral trade negotiations, a WTO member state (A) demands concessions from a trading partner (B), who has implemented some trade-distorting measure.
Let the present size of the measure be normalized to one and let zero represent full compliance with A's demand, so that any number on the open interval between zero and one represents a correspondingly reduced barrier size. Assume that A and B have linear, monotonic, and competing preferences over the trade barrier, such that B's utility is strictly increasing in barrier size, while A's is strictly decreasing. Suppose further that B can be of two types: the non-compliant type (B NC ), for whom there is some additional penalty to be paid for full compliance, and the compliant type (B C ), for whom there is no additional cost. Let this additional cost for the non-compliant type be represented by > 0. State B's type is the result of an initial draw by nature, such that B is compliant with probability 0 < < 1 and noncompliant with complementary probability. This type is private information for B, but the distribution of types is common knowledge. State A's beliefs about state B's type are potentially based on two factors. First, they are affected by the prior probability that state B is compliant. Empirically, this probability is a function of the state's ties to import-competing industries, who will attempt to punish governments that concede too much. A government that is able to preserve some or all of its trade violation will not face any punishment from import-competitors while, one that completely concedes to the opponent's demands, without getting anything in return, is seen as selling out the domestic industry, and pays a cost premium. Second, state A will take into account any previous observations of state B's behavior. In cases in which A has previously observed B complying or not complying with judicial rulings, it will incorporate this information according to Bayesian principles.
The game is depicted in Figure 1, Retaliation may also provide a similar benefit to A's domestic industries. However, because
A's import-competing industries did not mobilize for the benefit, the ultimate value of retaliation for the state is reduced by some factor, ∈ (0, 1 payoff; otherwise, they receive the status quo payoff.
[ Figure 1 here]
Players' preferences over outcomes are as follows. For A, the ideal outcome is full compliance by B, which it prefers to retaliation, wherein it will recover only of the cost.
Retaliation is in turn is preferred to the status quo. Formally, ( ) > ( ) > ( ). A's
preference with respect to a negotiated settlement depends on where the settlement falls. It prefers offers such that N is low to those for which it is high. B, by contrast, most prefers the status quo, as it continues to enjoy the benefits of its trade-distorting measure. It prefers this to retaliation by A, which will eliminate any such benefits. The compliant type, B C , is indifferent 4 Both assumptions above can easily be relaxed by assigning some exogenous probability to the outcomes. Doing so will not affect the substantive results of the model, but rather will alter B's optimal negotiated offer (N*).
Uncertainty about the outcome of litigation increases the bargaining power of state B and reduces the value of N*. Uncertainty about the end of the negotiating round makes litigation more attractive, increasing the bargaining power of A, and increasing the optimal N*. Indeed, as the probability that the round ends successfully approaches 1, the incentive to negotiate disappears. This is a game of incomplete information, requiring a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). It can be solved using backward induction. We make the assumption that, when indifferent, a state has a preference for the more peaceful choice (i.e., concession, negotiation, compliance, or non-retaliation), and that in the case of off-the-equilibrium-path (OTEP) play, A believes B to be of the compliant type. We discuss the latter assumption below.
Analysis
Given our assumptions, players have dominant strategies at each node, and thus there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, there exist no non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibria. Beginning from the final node, players' equilibrium strategies follow. If litigation has proceeded and B refuses to comply, A strictly prefers retaliation, which allows it to recoup some of the costs of the barriers, to non-retaliation. Given this strategy, when faced with an adverse judgment, B C will prefer to comply, while B NC will refuse, strictly preferring retaliation to compliance. Because A is unaware of what type of B it is facing, its decision following a negotiated offer by B will be a function of the probability that B is compliant (p).
In particular, it will accept any proposed barrier level, ≤ (0) + (1 − )(1 − ), and reject any larger proposal. Given these preferences and A's beliefs, the optimal offer for both types of state B will be at state A's reservation value, * = (1 − )(1 − ). 5 Because this value must be strictly positive, both types will prefer offering * to refusing to negotiate. The feasible equilibrium values of * span the open unit interval. Because * < 1 in equilibrium,
A will prefer (the threat of) litigation to acceptance of the status quo. Finally, given the initial choice between concession and refusal to concede, the fact that * > 0 will lead both types of B to refuse concessions initially. The equilibrium beliefs for A are simply that B is of type B C with probability p, and of type B NC with probability 1 − . Because both types behave similarly on the equilibrium path, state A's prior and posterior beliefs are equivalent in equilibrium. Given any off-the-equilibrium-path play by B, A believes B to be of type B C with probability one.
The equilibrium outcome in this game is a negotiated proposal by B,
which is accepted by A. The equilibrium offer depends on the distribution of types of B and on the benefit to A of retaliatory barriers. As the likelihood that B is of the non-compliant type increases, the equilibrium value of * also increases, leading to a larger portion of the tradedistorting measure remaining in effect. On the other hand, as the benefit from retaliating grows, the equilibrium value of * decreases, leading to a reduction in the agreed-upon trade distortion level. In all cases, however, negotiation is expected to occur, with the states' beliefs about the outcome of litigation influencing the agreed-upon settlement.
[ Figure 2 here]
The driving force in the model above is the authorization to retaliate (or, perhaps more importantly, the credible threat of retaliation) that A receives from successful litigation. We can contrast this to the situation depicted in Figure 2 , in which trade negotiations do not occur under the shadow of litigation In such a scenario, A lacks any sort of stick with which to believe that ̂< , then both types of state B will have an incentive to deviate toward = (1 − )(1 −), and no equilibrium can be sustained. Thus, an equilibrium only exists if A's posterior belief about the probability that B is compliant is at least p. We choose ̂= 1 for simplicity. 
Empirically observable implications
The argument presented so far captures how litigation in the WTO affects ongoing multilateral trade negotiations. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis we turn to identifying a number of observable empirical implications of our theory. One of the key premises of our model is that a WTO member (or group of members) is in a position to threaten (credibly) the imposition of concentrated costs on another WTO member by initiating a complaint at the WTO, and thereby threaten to impose retaliatory measures in the case of non-compliance. Thus, our implications are conditioned on this assumption. First, we expect to observe that litigation is a key factor influencing the strategic calculus of WTO member states involved in the dispute. This means that we should be able to trace the (credible) threat or initiation of a dispute to an increase in the set of feasible agreements between the two disputants in the context of multilateral trade negotiations relative to the status quo ante.
When a state cannot credibly threaten to litigate, the bargaining window will not expand, and thus we expect a negotiated settlement to be unlikely. Second, the location of the agreement (if one exists), should be a function of the credibility of the first state's threat to litigate and the probability that the second state is of the compliant type. A state should be able to extract greater concessions through negotiations when its threats are believed and when its opponent is likely to comply with an adverse ruling. Empirically, factors such as the level of organization of various domestic groups will cause the likelihood that a given state is compliant to vary across issue areas. However, an opponent should still be able to infer something about a state's likelihood of compliance on a given issue if it observes it complying (or not complying) in previous instances. Third, our argument does not suggest that litigation affects the likelihood of success for multilateral trade negotiations. Our analysis is limited to the analysis of how litigation affects the likelihood of agreement between the two sides involved in the dispute. For this agreement to be implemented, the dyad's overlapping set of feasible agreements would have to intersect with the win-set of all other participants -a negotiation outcome analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we are more interested in the results of dyadic negotiations than in outcomes per se.
Agricultural trade liberalization in the shadow of WTO law
We demonstrate the empirical plausibility of our theoretical argument by analyzing the interactions between one potential (and sometimes actual) complainant, Brazil, on the one hand and two potential defendants, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), on the other. We examine how these interactions affected bargaining dynamics on agricultural trade liberalization in the Doha round. Both cases meet the scope conditions of our argument, as they concern pairs of WTO members with large and attractive markets in a position of trade interdependence, a necessary condition for a potential defendant to worry about the threat of retaliation by a potential complainant. One attractive feature about the cases that we investigate is temporal in nature. Both cases occurred around the time that litigation became an option for WTO disputants, providing us with important variation within cases. Therefore, we are able to trace how states' behaviors evolved in response to changes in the value of one of our key explanatory factors. In addition, the two cases display significant variation with respect to the second independent variable, namely the defendant's expected likelihood of compliance. In both instances, the message of a credible threat to resort to the DSM was conveyed to the potential target and the opposing state could reasonably expect to lose the case. However, while the EU's behavior signaled to Brazil that it was likely to be a compliant type, the actions taken by the US demonstrated a reluctance to comply. We show that these differences significantly affected the outcomes in the respective cases.
Agricultural negotiations and the pending expiration of the peace clause: the EU and Brazil
The Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) bound WTO members to a set of clear commitments limiting export subsidies and domestic support, and ensuring market access.
The quantitative impact of market-access-enhancing tariff reductions in the URAA on agricultural trade was marginal because the cuts in import tariffs took place from a base value that was frequently inflated to high levels -a practice known as 'dirty tariffication' (Tangermann, 1999) . In addition, domestic support policies of major developed countries were required to make only minor changes to bring them in conformity with the rules of the agreement (Josling 1998 ). Yet, the agreement contained the seeds for deeper trade income countries, such as the EU and the US (Cairns Group Farm Leaders, 1998 , 1999a , 2000 .
As our model suggests, the prospect of the peace clause expiration was deemed by both relevant interest groups and policy makers to provide Brazil with an effective tool to extract concessions in the negotiating game. Although the threat to resort to the DSM after 2003 was certainly a powerful tool in the hands of Brazilian policymakers, it offered no certainty that
Brazilian agricultural exporters would be better off. As reform of agricultural policy reform was known to be particularly difficult to achieve in the EU (Swinnen 2008) , the possibility that non-compliance would follow an adverse WTO ruling was a scenario that needed to be contemplated. Therefore, Brazil opted for a constructive engagement in negotiations, while maintaining a credible threat to resort to litigation. In the period preceding the launch of the Doha Round private sector representatives and policymakers in Brazil combined calls for an ambitious agenda aimed at the elimination of all trade-distorting subsidies and a substantial improvement in market access, with an explicit reference to the prospect that the expiration of the peace clause would eliminate all constraints against the use of the DSM to challenge developed countries (Cairns Group, 2000a , 2000b Cairns Group Farm Leaders, 2001; Cotta, 2001; Ragawan 2001) .
As the largest provider of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, the EU was one of the main targets of those potential complainants. Organizations representing European farmers' interests, as well as public decision makers in DG Agriculture, knew that these domestic policies were likely to be deemed WTO incompatible by an eventual ruling following a dispute in the WTO. 8 It is estimated that in the late 1990s roughly 45% of the EU's producers support estimate (PSE) 9 was vulnerable to legal challenges (Poletti 2010) . As was noted at the time, compliance with a succession of hostile panel reports following the expiration of the peace clause might lead to a death of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by a thousand cuts (Swinbank, 1999, p. 45 , 2003) , whereas the position adopted by Brazil and other members of the Cairns Group was more aggressive, including requests for a complete phasing out of export subsidies by a three-year implementation period, the elimination of blue and amber box direct 9 An indicator created to provide a summary measure of the producer subsidy that would be equivalent to all the forms of support provided to farmers including direct farm subsidies that may or may not encourage production domestically, as well as market price support provided by import tariffs and export subsidies 10 Authors' interview at COPA-COGECA, Brussels, 16 June 2010. payments by a five-year implementation period, a tighter definition of green-box payments, significant tariff cuts, and an opposition to any extension of the peace clause (Cairns Group, 2000 Group, , 2000a Group, , 2000b ). Yet, the two developments strictly connected to the EU's legal vulnerability contributed to a softening of its bargaining position and to a partial convergence toward the positions of countries such as Brazil. Second, in parallel and in connection to these developments, the EU began a further reform of CAP. With the June 2003 agreement on the Fischler reforms, the structure of CAP was significantly transformed by decoupling most direct aid from production requirements, turning the largest share of potentially actionable policy instruments into WTO compatible ones, while reducing support provided to European farmers only marginally (Swinnen, 2008) .
Overcoming the likely effects of the expiration of the peace clause was clearly a key factor behind this reform, as it had the most pronounced impact on the likely targets of legal challenges in the WTO and was explicitly aimed at enabling the EU to allocate the new direct payments into the WTO-compatible green box (European Commission, 2002).
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These developments paved the way for a gradual convergence of positions between the two sides. Having realized that Brazil was both willing and able to use litigation to its advantage, and using domestic reform to increase its room to maneuver, the EU began to soften its was largely motivated by a desire to forestall being forced to dismantle these instruments as a result of legal rulings, which the EU feared in the wake of the sugar case.
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The deal on export subsidies was greeted by the Brazilian government as a victory that would entail significant cost reductions for the domestic agricultural industry, while serving as the beginning of the end of agricultural subsidies (Agra Europe, 6 August 2004). Meanwhile, the EU had started an internal discussion about how to change its sugar regime to implement the WTO ruling, which culminated in a reform adopted by the Council of Agricultural Ministers in November 2005 that allowed the EU to substantially comply with the far-reaching requirements of the WTO (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2008) . The EU's willingness to comply with the WTO ruling against it on sugar subsidies allowed Brazil to update its beliefs about the EU's type: its compliance on one issue suggests that it would be more likely to comply on related issues. In terms of the model, following EU compliance with WTO rules on sugar subsidies, Brazil expected p to be higher, and thus believed that it could demand more.
70%. On market access, the G20 had asked for a 75% reduction of highest tariffs, while the EU offered a maximum cut of 60%, an average cut of 46% coupled with a request to be able to designate 8% of tariff lines as sensitive. Further convergence could be achieved at the subsequent July 2006 Ministerial in Geneva, when the EU improved its offer on market access, getting close to tariff reductions demanded by the G20 group (an average tariff cut by 54%) and lowering its demands on sensitive products to 5% (Blustein, 2009 Although a deal could not be struck in Geneva -mostly as a result of the US inflexibility in both asking for greater market access concessions from the EU, and refusing to meet EU demands for greater domestic support reductions, Brazil continued to strive for a negotiated compromise with the EU in the Doha round, rather than shifting to a litigation. Although its updated beliefs about the EU suggested an increased likelihood of compliance, some fears remained that powerful farm lobbies in the EU might encourage a less compliant attitude, were Brazil to litigate (Camargo 2008) . it is clear that legal vulnerability acted as a trigger to increase the set of agreements acceptable to both the EU and Brazil concerning agriculture. Had Brazil been unable to litigate, it is unlikely that any mutually acceptable agreements would have existed.
Agriculture negotiations and the pending expiration of the peace clause: the US and Brazil
Much like the EU position on agriculture, the US position in the Doha Round's agricultural negotiations was an attempt to strike a delicate balance between significant pressure from Congress to protect farm subsidies and the constraints of a judicialized WTO. A variety of analyses have demonstrated that, as in the EU case, a wide array of domestic support schemes for farmers in the US would likely become challengeable by third parties in the WTO after the expiration of the peace clause (Josling, Zhao, Carcelen and Arha, 2006; Kennedy, 2008; Porterfield, 2006; Steinberg and Josling, 2003; Sumner, 2005) . Consistent with our expectations, the US negotiating strategy was largely affected by legal vulnerability.
With the approval of the 1996 Farm Bill, agricultural domestic support schemes were transformed by eliminating deficiency payments and replacing them with production flexibility contract (PFC) payments, fixed payments that would gradually decrease over a period of seven years. While the United States Department of Agriculture projected that this new approach to farm subsidies would keep the United States far below the $19.1 billion URAA limit, these estimates proved inaccurate. Indeed, when commodity prices collapsed in the late 1990s, Congress responded with a series of supplemental bills that provided market loss assistance payments to producers of the same commodities that were eligible for PFC payments (Porterfield, 2006) .
Agricultural domestic support schemes were further increased with the 2002 Farm Bill, permitting spending to increase by about $8 billion per year above the levels projected by the 1996 Farm Bill and institutionalizing additional payments tied to commodity prices, thus creating larger production incentives (Sumner, 2005) . The 2002 Farm Bill established that the bulk of US subsidies would be provided through market loan program payments, direct payments, and countercyclical payments.
Under both bills, US domestic farm subsidies were vulnerable to WTO legal challenges.
Moreover, the famous WTO ruling on US cotton subsidies clearly showed that, with respect to the 1996 Farm Bill, the US was contravening WTO rules. were WTO compatible green-box subsidies (production flexibility contract payments and direct payments) were more than minimally trade distorting, and the US was found to exceed the $19.1 billion cap on permissible amber-box support. For this reason, US policy was ruled to have caused prejudice to Brazil's interests by causing significant price suppression in the world market for cotton (Sumner, 2005) . Notably, the United States declined to comply with the WTO ruling, eventually allowing Brazil to impose sanctions. Ultimately, the dispute was not resolved until 2010 when, following a number of compliance complaints by Brazil, the two parties agreed on a negotiated settlement of the controversy (USTR 2010).
Interestingly for our analysis, this case can be considered as the first 'post-peace clause' challenge to farm subsidies (Josling, Zhao, Carcelen and Arha, 2006) . cyclical payments, and, to a lesser extent, direct payments could also become challengeable under the SCM Agreement on grounds that they cause serious prejudice to foreign competitors in the US domestic or international markets (Porterfield, 2006; Schnepf and Womach, 2007; Steinberg and Josling, 2003) . Brazil did not passively accept the terms of negotiations offered by the US. Indeed, Brazil fought hard to resist the US strategy of shifting trade-distorting and legally-vulnerable domestic farm subsidies into WTO-compatible spending. Moreover, while siding with the US in its requests for large cuts in agricultural tariffs, Brazil sought to push the US toward greater concessions with respect to the actual percentage reductions in domestic support (G20, 2005 Group, 2005 Group, , 2006 Group, , 2007 . For Brazil negotiations in the present were clearly preferable to litigation in the future (Camargo, 2005) , especially if the ultimate outcome of the strategy---even if Brazil was victorious in litigation---was unclear.
These reactions are very much in line with what our model suggests. As in the case of the challenge against EU sugar export subsidies, Brazil had used the cotton dispute to get a better deal in Geneva negotiations. Brazilian officials however, knew that the road toward implementation of the WTO ruling was loaded with political landmines because of the tremendous political influence of farmers in the US system and the visibility that the cotton issue had acquired in the US (Goldberg, Lawrence and Milligan, 2004) . The political resistance to the implementation of WTO rulings by the US proved that these expectations were correct (see Schnepf 2011 for a timeline), and that the US was relatively unlikely to comply with adverse WTO rulings. In other words, the US was perceived to be (and acted as) a non-compliant type of disputant. In this context, it is not surprising that although Brazil could revert to a credible strategy of litigation against the US, it preferred to continue engaging in negotiations that would likely entail a small amount of concessions rather than risk non-compliance in litigation.
As noted above, the Geneva 2006 WTO Ministerial Conference failed to identify a common ground for compromise. Among the many contentious issues that remained unresolved, the US insistence on greater market access concessions by the EU and its refusal to improve its offers on domestic support stand out as major bones of contention, and the positions of the key players did not change substantially by December 2008. The lack of an actual agreement in agricultural negotiations, however, does not run directly counter to our argument. Reaching an agreement would require a compromise between all major stakeholders involved in the negotiations process. As for the dyadic relationship between the US and Brazil considered here, it seems likely that the chance of any overlap in the negotiating positions of the two parties would have been even less likely in the absence of legal vulnerability. Consistent with our expectations, both parties preferred to tackle existing barriers trade that could be challenged in the WTO DSM through negotiations rather than litigation and gradually moved toward a compromise (though one that entailed relatively few concessions), eventually allowing them to minimize costs for the potential defendant and to reduce at least some of the costs incurred by exporters in the potential complainant.
Conclusion
In One caveat associated with our analysis is that the mechanism that we highlight assumes that the issue under dispute is sufficiently important to the defendant to induce some non-zero probability of non-compliance. In those cases in which the costs of compliance are sufficiently low or broadly distributed, compliance may be a foregone conclusion, and a complainant can simply opt for litigation with the assurance that it will receive everything it desires. While this limits the cases for which we can expect legal vulnerability to increase the chances for cooperation, those that remain tend to be among the most relevant and important.
Moreover, while the agricultural cases considered here speak to our theoretical model particularly well, the applicability of the argument is by no means restricted to this particular issue area. For instance, a similar logic may apply in the case of the Doha Round negotiations concerning WTO rules on antidumping, as the initiation of litigation by the EU, Japan, and
Korea over the US's so-called "zeroing" practice for counting dumping margins also seems to have triggered a willingness on both sides to pursue a negotiated settlement.
Our findings have important implications for the study on the effects of international trade institutions on preference formation and state behavior in WTO member states. First, our analysis advances the debate on the conditions for international cooperation. The conventional wisdom posits that the odds of defection from cooperation are greater when actors engage in negotiations concerning prospective agreements that they expect to be highly enforceable (Fearon, 1998; Koremenos et al., 2001 ). In line with this argument, some have suggested that increased enforceability of rules may end up endangering the stability of the world trading system by decreasing the propensity of WTO members to further commit to trade liberalization (Goldstein and Martin 2000) . This analysis may well be correct Finally, our analysis suggests an easily expandable research program. Besides assessing the explanatory power of our argument in other areas of negotiations, future research could further develop our argument along comparative lines. For instance, it seems plausible to expect the nature of the issue at stake to determine whether legal vulnerability can trigger this positive dynamic of cooperation. A necessary condition for our argument to hold is thus that the issue at stake be divisible, as it would allow such a middle-ground compromise to be reached. Further research could thus investigate whether legal vulnerability plays out differently across issue areas, comparing its effects when relatively continuous issues are at stake (e.g., tariffs, nonzero quotas, and subsidies), and when more discrete issues are at stake 
